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THE NINTH AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
By KNOWLTON H. KELSEY*
Certain editorial comment on the death of California's
"Little A. A. A." at the hands of the California Supreme
Court, following closely upon the invalidation of the A. A. A.
at the hands of the "Nine Old Men," led to the suggestion
that a discussion of the Ninth Amendment would be of interest
to this bar.'
The comment was to the effect that the power of regula-
tion must reside somewhere and the implication was that all
power must reside in either the Federal or State governments.
The comment ignored the fact that powers are reserved to
the people as well as to the states, and, further, that rights,
which preclude power, are also reserved to the people.
To suggest that the power to regulate agriculture, industry,
business or any other particular activity, must, of necessity, be
in either the Federal or the State governments is to deny the
whole philosophy of limited government created by and of
individual rights recognized by the Constitution of the United
States and under the constitutions of the several states.
O Of the Huntington, Indiana, Bar.
1 Gen. Hugh E. Johnson: "the Nine Old Men in their black kimonos."
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The subject here considered has to do with only a small
part of the implications contained in the editorial comment
above mentioned. We are here to consider only a small part
of the limitations on the government of the United States-
that limitation or prohibition contained in the Ninth Amend-
ment
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain RIGHTSj shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others restrained by the people."
That provision is a companion to and in a measure the
complement of the Tenth Amendment "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.
Together, these articles 'of amendment express the funda-
mental theory of American government, National and State-
the theory of reserved rights and of delegated powers. The
former article specifies rights, the latter specifies powers.
When the two provisions are laid beside each other, it be-
comes evident that there was some distinction in the minds
of the framers of those amendments between declarations of
right and limitations on or prohibitions of power If no dis-
tinction had been in mind, the Ninth Amendment would have
been unnecessary The Tenth Amendment, reserving powers
to states and people, would have been enough, when taken with
certain limitations or on reservations of power and with
certain reservations of rights in the body of the Constitution
or in other Amendments.
In a consideration of the Ninth Amendment and an inquiry
into the nature of the rights mentioned or suggested therein,
we are concerned, not with rights at sufferance, not rights
enjoyed by the failure to exercise powers granted, but with
relatively absolute rights, if any right may be said to be abso-
lute in any society, with natural, or inherent, or inalienable
rights-whatever natural, inherent or inalienable rights may
be. And particularly, our question here is as to what rights,
if any, not enumerated, are retained by the people. A
thorough consideration of the subject would involve a proc-
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ess of determination and of elimination-determination as
to what the rights of the people are or were, as considered
by the framers of the Constitution and of the several Amend-
ments, and elimination of those rights or portions of right
which are referred to as being enumerated.
Rights.may arise or rather appear by reason of limitations
placed upon or by the limits of granted powers, as the right
to uniformity or to apportionment of taxation. 2 Such rights
may be pointed out by a prohibition against the exercise of
power or by a specification of rights, as in Article I, Sec. 9,
and by the several amendments among the first ten, and which
may be difficult to classify as prohibitions of power or as
enumerations of right. Rights may also exist in having the
granted powers exercised, or in having them exercised in the
manner and for the purpose for which granted, e. g. Article
IV,'Sec. 4, the guarantee of a republican form of government.
Rights, whether asserted, indicated, or set out as prohibi-
tions of or as limitations on power, may be assumed to be
enumerated. Thus the limitations on taxation, 3 on suspen-
sion of the writ of habeas corpus, 4 on trial of crimes5 and
conviction of treason,6 and the prohibitions against bills of
attainder,7 ex post facto laws,8 corruption of blood" or for-
feiture, 10 are probably among those referred to in the Ninth
Amendment as being enumerated. Those which with more
certainty can be classed as being enumerated are set out by
the other Amendments and include freedom of speech, 1
religion,' 2 press,13 assemblage, : 4 petition,' 5 to keep and bear
2 Art. I, Sec. 8, Sub. 1, Art. I, Sec. 9, Sub. 4 & 5.
3 See note 2, Sub. 1, Art. 1, Sec. 9, Sub. 4 & 5.
4 Art. 1, Sec. 9, Sub. 2.
5 Art. 3, Sec. 2, Sub. 3.
6 Art. 3, Sec. 3.
7 Art. 1, Sec. 9, Sub. 3, Art. 3, Sec. 3, Sub. 2.
8 Art. 1, Sec. 9, Sub. 3.
9 Art. 3, Sec. 3, Sub. 2.
10 Art. 3, Sec. 3, Sub. 2.
11 Amendment I.
12 Amendment I.
13 Amendment I.
14 Amendment I.
15 Amendment I.
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arms,16 on quartering troops,'7 from search and seizure,' of
presentment and indictment,' 9 against double jeopardy, against
self incrimination, 20 against deprivation of life, liberty or
property,21 against taking of property,22 for fair and speedy
trials in criminal matters, 23 for jury trials in civil suits at com-
mon law,24 against excessive bail,25 and against cruel and un-
usual punishments. 28 As against the state's individual rights,
specified in the constitution, but not necessarily included in the
scope of the Ninth Amendment, include freedom from bills
of attamer,27 ex post facto laws, 28 laws impairing the obli-
gation of contract,29 abridgement of privileges and immuni-
ties,30 deprivation of life, liberty or property,3' for equal pro-
tection of law,8 and against denial of sufferage.38
The list seems imposing. A recital of the rights in this
manner enumerated or pointed out seems like a catalogue
of human rights. But do the rights, surrender by the grant
of power, express or implied, or expressly reserved by enu-
meration, prohibition or limitation, exhaust the list of human
rights? Are no other rights retained by the people? Is the
Ninth Amendment, and is the dosing phrase of the Tenth
Amendment as well, merely like the words of a sale bill
specifying "other articles too numerous to mention" on the
improbable chance that something worth while may have
.been forgotten?
It has been held that in interpreting the Constitution, every
word must have its due force and meaning; that no word was
unnecessarily used or needlessly added, that no word can be
rejected as superfluous and unmeaning.3 4
16 Amendment II.
17 Amendment. IIL
Is Amendment IV
19 Amendment V
2o Amendment V
21 Amendment V, 2 2 Amendment V., 23 Amendment VI., 2 4 Amendment VII,
25 Amendment VIII, 26.Amendment VIII, 27 Art. I, Sec. 10, Sub. 1, 28Art. 1,
Sec. fO, Sub. 1. 29 Art. I, Sec. 10, Sub. 1, 30 Amendment XIV, 31 Amendment
XIV, 32 Amendment XIV, 33 Amendments XV & XIX, 34 Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606. Knowiton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 44. L. ed. 969.
Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 10 L. ed. 579. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S.
239, 43 L ed. 432. Cohen& v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 264, 5 L. ed. 257. Myers v.
U. S., 272 U. S. 52, 71 L ed. 160.
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With this rule in mind we must therefore assume that in
the minds of the framers of this amendment, other rights
than those "enumerated" did, and supposedly do now, exist.
Natural rights, such as are declared to be inalienable and
which, as such, are personal to every individual as a citizen
of a free community, include the right to personal liberty,
to personal security, to acquire and enjoy property, to re-
ligious liberty, to freedom of conscience, to freedom of con-
tract, to freedom of press, speech, assemblage, petition, to
freedom to engage in profession, trade, business, or calling,
and the right of privacy 35 Natural rights have been defined
as (1) Such rights as appertain originally and essentially to
man, such as are inherent in his nature, and which he enjoys
as a man, independent of any particular act on his side, also
(2) Those which grow out of the nature of man and depend
upon personality as distinguished from those created by law;
also (3) Those rights which are innate, and which come from
the very laws of nature, such as life, liberty, pursuit of happi-
ness, and self preservation. 8 Natural rights, arising, if they
do arise, from the nature of man or from the laws of nature,
may be as indefinite as the law of nature which Bentham says
is but a phrase to justify some individuals in their personal
classification of what is right and what is wrong.37 But Bent-
ham's philosophy of utility, of pain and pleasure, had little if
any influence upon the American thought which framed the
Constitution *and the first Ten Amendments. The Colonists
had argued, petitioned and contended, and finally waged war,
not for philosophic perfection of any utilitarian doctrine of
rights, but for the rights of Englishmen. These rights were
best expressed by and most familiar to the colonists in Black-
stone's Commentaries, whether the work of that writer was a
reliable guide to philosophic or historical jurisprudence or not.
According to Edmund Burke (Conciliation Speech, Mar.
22, 1776), nearly as many of Blackstone's Commentaries
were sold in America as in England. It would not seem im-
35 12 C. J. Constitutional Law.
30 45 C. J. 394, n. 96.
37 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch. II, Sec. XV, note 6.
See Bentham, Principles of Legislation, p. 82 & p. 84.
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probable that the natural and inherent rights of Englishmen
listed by Blackstone and fought for in the War of Independ-
ence, are more exact statements of the rights set out in the
Constitution and referred to under the Ninth Amendment,
than any theoretical or philosophic classification by Bentham,
Austin or any other critic, on whose opposition to the teaching
of Blackstone the more modern school of jurisprudence seems
based .3
It has been held that "The first ten amendments were
not meant to lay down any novel principles of government,
but simply to embody certain guarantees and immunities, which
we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had
been from time immemorial subject to well recognized excep-
tions."" Further it has been held that "As the object of the
firist eight amendments to the Constitution was to incorporate
into the fundamental law of the land certain principles of
natural justice which had become permanently fixed in the
jurisprudence of the mother country, the construction given
to those principles by the English courts is cogent evidence
of what they were designed to secure and the limitations that
should be put upon them."'b
Blackstone"9 classifies the fundamental rights of English-
men under three heads (I) Personal Security, (II) Personal
Liberty, (III) Private Property, with numerous subdivisions
and refinements of and limitations of each classification and
with certain subordinate rights. To these, Chancellor Kent
adds, as a specific and characteristic contribution of American
law, (IV) Religious Freedom.
By certain of the States the Constitution, like the Covenant
of the League of Nations, was ratified with certain reserva-
tions, certain "impressions," certain suggestions.
With specified "impressions" Virginia ratified.40  These
"impressions" may be summarized as follows that the powers
granted under the Constitution, being derived from the peo-
38 Hicks, Men and Books Famous in the Law, p. 129.
RRobertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 281.
b Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 600, 40 L. ed. 819.
39 Blackstone's Commentaries Book 1, pp. 129-145.
40 Formation of the Union, p. -1027.
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ple, may be resumed by them whenever perverted to their
injury; that every power not therein granted remains in the
people at their will, that 'no right of any denomination can
be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified except in the in-
stances and for the purposes for which power is given, and
that among other essentials, liberty of the press and of con-
science cannot be abridged. And to the ratification by Vir-
ginia was added. "That there be a Declaration or Bill of
Rights asserting and securing from encroachment the essen-
tial and unalienable rights of the people." This addition
suggested that. "there are certain natural rights of which
men, -when they form a social compact cannot deprive or
divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and pro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety," and further "that the doctrine of non-resistance to
arbitrary authority is absurd," and to these were added no
hereditary offices, separation of powers of government, free
and frequent elections by general sufferage, no suspension of
laws, jury trials with unanimous verdict, due process, jury
trials in cases involving property or character, free complete
and speedy justice, reasonable bail and punishment, freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom of assembly,
petition, press, religion, conscience, and to bear arms, and
subjection of the military The document reads like an ex-
cerpt from or summary of Blackstone on the subject of rights,
or like a list of concessions demanded from a tyrant sovereign.
New York 1 ratified under similar reservations or "im-
pressions," adding double jeopardy and habeas corpus to the
list. The Bill of Rights suggested by South Carolina42 fol-
lowed closely that of Virginia as did also that of Rhode
Island.43 (See Formation of the Union.)
By this brief review of the reservations, if so they may be
called, of these four states to their ratifications of the Consti-
tution, it is not implied that their enumerations of rights have
or had any binding force. They are reviewed solely to get
41 Formation of the Union, p. 1034.
42 Formation of the Union, p. 1044.
43Formation of the Union, p. 1052.
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some possible suggestion as to what the authors of the Ninth
Amendment may have had in mind when the amendment was
proposed, and what the people who ratified that amendment
thought, and what the words, as a part of our basic law, now
mean, if they now mean anything.
The proponents of the Constitution, as drawn up and sub-
mitted by the Convention, argued as against the objection of
the lack of any Bill of Rights (I) that all essential rights
were already safeguarded by specific enumeration of many
essential rights, 44 (II) that the government created was one
of enumerated powers only, 44 45 (III) that a positive declara-
tion of some essential rights could not be obtained with the
requisite latitude,45 (IV) that the jealousy of the states
against encroachment of their own powers was a safeguard,45
and (V) that the teachings of experience proved the inefficacy
of a bill of rights.45 44
Hamilton, 44 in answering the advocates of a bill of rights,
maintained that the Constitution did contain a number of
provisions in favor of particular rights and privileges, but
that "a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less
applicable to a constitution like that under consideration,
which is merely intended to regulate the general political
interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the
regulation of every species of personal and private concerns."
His contention was, further, that a bill of rights would be
dangerous because, containing various exceptions to powers
not granted, the exceptions would afford a colorable pretext
to claim more powers than were granted.46
Jefferson 5 maintained that a constitutive act, which leaves
some precious articles unnoticed, and raised implications
against others, makes necessary a bill of rights by way of
supplement; that if a sufficiently comprehensive declaration
could not be formulated to secure all rights, nevertheless such
44 Federalist No. 84,, Hamilton.
45 Jefferson Works, Vol. III, pp. 4, 13 & 101, Vol. II, pp. 329, 358.
46 See Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S., p. 372. Power of eminent domain held
implied by the prohibition in the Fifth Amendment against taking private
property for public use without compensation, although no express power of
condemnation was granted under the Constitution. (The power was after-
wards asserted as a necessary attribute of sovereignty.)
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as possible should be secured, that if the jealousy of states is
to be a safeguard against encroachments of Federal power,
a declaration of rights was needed upon which states could
found their opposition, that the inconveniences, attending the
limitations on government by bills of right which may cramp
the government in its useful exertions, are short lived and
reparable, while those inconveniences, resulting from the want
of such a declaration of rights, are permanent and irreparable,
moving from bad to worse. He adds "The executive, in our
government, is not the sole, it is scarcely the principal, object
of my jealousy The tyranny of legislatures is the most for-
midable dread at present, and will be for many years. That
of the executive will come in its turn, but it will be at some
remote period."
Justice Joseph Story says that the real point for argument
is "not whether a bill of rights is necessary, but what such a
bill of rights should contain", that a "bill of rights is im-
portant, and is often indispensable, whenever it operates as
a qualification upon powers actually granted by the people
to the government; that a bill of rights may be important
even when it goes beyond powers supposed to be granted be-
cause "it is not always possible to foresee the extent of the
actual reach of certain powers which are given in general
terms", which "may be construed (and perhaps fairly) to
certain classes of cases which did not at first appear to be
within them." In such a case a "bill of rights, then, operates
as a guard upon any extravagant or undue extension of such
powers." "It requires more than ordinary hardihood and
audacity of character to trample down principles which our
ancestors have consecrated with reverence, which we have
imbibed in our early education, which recommend themselves
to the world by their truth and simplicity; and which are con-
stantly placed before the eyes of the people, accompanied with
the imposing force of constitutional sanction." -1
Kent observes "The necessity of declaratory codes of
rights has been frequently questioned, in as much as the gov-
ernment * * * is the creature of the people * * * and
7 Story of the Consti ution, Vol. II, pp. 623-627.
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made responsible for maladministration. It may be observed,
on the one hand, that no gross violation of those absolute
rights which are clearly understood and settled by the com-
mon reason of mankind is to be apprehended in the ordinary
course of public affairs, and as to extraordinary instances of
faction and turbulence, and the corruption and violence which
they necessarily engender, no parchment checks can be relied
on as affording, under such circumstances, any effectual pro-
tection to public liberty When the spirit of liberty has fled,
and truth and justice are disregarded private rights can easily
be sacrificed under the forms of law " 48
Opposition to the adoption of the Constitution on the
ground of the lack of a bill of rights was so general and so
determined, that the advocates of adoption were forced to
the argument that the means and method of amendment were
readily available, and it was only by the assurance of the
speedy adoption of amendments embodying a declaration of
all essential rights, that the assent of the requisite number
of states was obtained. It may reasonably be said that the
adoption of the first ten amendments was a condition on the
ratification of the Constitution.49
And the preamble to the joint resolution of Congress, sub-
mitting twelve amendments (including the first ten) to the
states for ratification, recited "The conventions of a num-
ber of States having at the time of their adopting the Consti-
tution expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction
or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive
clauses should be added. And as extending the ground of
public confidences in the Government will best insure the
beneficent ends of its institution." (1 Stat. L. 97 )
The advocates of a Bill of Rights prevailed, and the first
ten amendments were adopted. The Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments seem to be designed to meet the Hamiltoman argu-
ment and to deny specifically any unmentioned grant of power
or any unnamed surrender of rights ;43 and also to meet the
objection mentioned by Jefferson" and to quiet the fear that
48 Kents Commentaries (12 Ed.), Vol. II, p. 8. (Followed by unacknowl-
edged excerpts from Story.)
49 O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 370. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law 960.
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a sufficiently broad and positive declaration could not be for-
mulated to cover all essential rights.
Of the Ninth Amendment, Story50 says "This clause was
manifestly introduced to prevent any preverse or ingenious
misapplication of the well known maxim, that an affirmation
in particular cases implies a negation in all others, and,
e converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an
affirmation in all others (citing Federalist, No. 83) The
maxim, rightly understood, is perfectly sound and safe; but
it has often been strangely forced from its natural meaning
into the support of the most dangerous political heresies.
The amendment was undoubtedly suggested by the reasoning
of the Federalist on the subject of a general bill of rights"
(citing Federalist, No. 84)
Story further says "In regard to another suggestion, that
the affirmance of certain rights might disparage others, or
might lead to argumentative implications in favor of other
powers, it might be sufficient to say that such a course of
reasoning could never be sustained upon any solid basis, and
it could never furnish any just ground of objection that in-
genuity might pervert or usurpation overleap the true sense.
That objection will equally lie against all powers, whether
large or limited, whether national or state, whether in a bill
of rights or in a frame of government. But a conclusive
answer is, that such an attempt may be interdicted (as it has
been) by a positive declaration in such a bill of rights, that
the enumeration of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." 51
There seems to be no case that decides the scope of the
Ninth Amendment even in part. In decisions where it is men-
tioned, it is either grouped with the Tenth Amendment in
decisions based upon or involving the latter, and hence con-
cerning reservation or denial of power, or it is merely classi-
fied as one of the first ten which are held to be limitations
on-national and not on state power No case has been found
that uses the Ninth Amendment as the basis for the assertion
or vindication of a Right.
50 Story on the Constitution, Vol. II, pp. 623-627.
51 Story on the Constitution, Vol. II, p. 626, Sec. 1867.
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Yet the Ninth Amendment concerns rights and every word
in the Constitution has meaning.
The paucity of judicial decision on the meaning and effect
of the provision here considered may result from a number
of causes. (1) All essential human rights may have been
covered by the express declarations of right in the original
Constitution or in the other Amendments. (2) All essential
human rights, no enumerated, may be covered by the limits
of or limitations upon the express and implied grant of
powers. (3) Any additional rights thought to have been
protected thereby may have been covered by judicial con-
struction and extension of expressly enumerated rights, espe-
cially those under the Fifth Amendment, to cover not only
the general classifications of rights catalogued by the great
commentators, but also all proper subdivisions and refinements
thereof. (4) Other -rights may exist which have not hereto-
fore been invaded, or which have not heretofore been vin-
dicated by the ingenuity of the legal profession or the discern-
ment of the courts. (5) Rights not expressly enumerated
may have been extinguished by long acquiescence of the pe6-
ple in legislative extension of Federal power or by judicial
decisions on the extent of power.
A survey of decided cases concerning the specifically enu-
merated rights leads to the conclusion that most general rights,
if not each variation or refinement thereof, listed by Eng-
lish and American commentators, as well as rights discussed
in connection with the adoption of the Constitution and
Amendments, have been considered by the courts and, in a
proper case, vindicated. Judicial decisions on the limits of or
the limitations on granted powers have resulted in the vin-
dication of rights. Decisions on due process have resulted in
the words life, liberty and property being expanded to such a
degree, especially as to property, that they seem to include
much, if not all of that, which is included under the usual
general classifications of rights.
The general, undefined, and illusive right "to the pursuit
of happiness," the elemental right of self preservation, and
the general statement in the Virginian "reservations" as to
the right to the "means of acquiring, possessing and protect-
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ing property and obtaining happiness and safety," insofar as
they are rights, and insofar as they contain elements not em-
braced within the enumerated rights, may be protected by
the Ninth Amendment. The right of privacy may contain
essentials beyond the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable search and seizure, and as to such essen-
tials may come within the category of unenumerated rights.
In other words, there may be a right to freedom from perse-
cution and annoyance by those temporarily intrusted with
power, when no fraud, concealment or wrong doing is shown,
as was recently held by the Circuit Court of the Third Cir-
cuit, which ruled that a second investigation into the business
transactions of individuals, after the lapse of three years, for
no other apparent cause than the order of superior officers,
constituted not only a violation of the prohibition against un-
lawful search and seizure, but was also "a violation of the
natural law of privacy in one's own affairs which exists in
liberty loving people and nations, no right being more vital
to 'liberty and pursuit of happiness' than the protection of a
citizen's private affairs, their right to be let alone."
Property is directly mentioned three times in the Constitu-
tion-twice in the Fifth and once in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Most of the other provisions which declare rights or
set limitations on power are concerned with personal rights
as distinguished from property rights. This fact should be
remembered when criticism is made that the Constitution ex-
alts property above human rights. The document was drawn
by men of substance, and both it and its Amendments rati-
fied by conventions or by legislatures elected for the most part
by limited sufferage, and yet the fundamental declaration of
law has little of property in it. Can it be that rights in prop-
erty, its use, enjoyment, ownership-all the attributes of pri-
vate ownership-were accepted as being so fundamental as
to need no safeguard beyond the limits of or limitations on
power, or beyond the Fifth Amendment? Or was Ninth
Amendment designed to cover axiomatic rights to property as
well as any unmentioned but axiomatic personal rights?
Rights, more or less abstract rights, may exist in having
the government discharge its governmental function and also
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in having the government refrain from undertakings outside
of the sphere of governmental authority Such rights may
be abstract rights because of the limits on the judicial func-
tion, which depends on the proper presentation of a justiciable
issue, and the assertion of right by one having a substantial
or ascertainable interest therein. Thus the right to challenge
a questionable appropriation has been denied to a State as
the representatives of its citizens and to one who could show
no specific interest in the fund appropriated, 52 but has been
granted where a specific and direct interest could be shown. 3
The Ninth Amendment (as well as the Tenth) was invoked
by the petitioners in the recent T V.A. Case, and the Court
there held that the "Ninth Amendment, insuring the rights
retained by the people, does not withdraw the rights which
are expressly granted to the federal government." Under
this case, as defined and limited by the Court, the exercise of
governmental powers (to the extent) considered by the de-
cision, did not violate any unenumerated right. The right of
the government to use its almost limitless power to tax, and
its constitutional right to spend, to compete with its citizens
has not been settled. The power to tax and destroy has been
long established. The power to spend and destroy has not.
The Fifth Amendment enumerates rights to which each
great substantive power of Congress is subject.54 Is. this true,
in a proper case, of each enumerated right? And are unenu-
merated rights weaker because unnamed? A right that yields
to the exercise of authorized power, express or implied, is
no right.
The legislative and the executive, throughout our history,
have been, in the main, as zealous as the courts in their respect
and regard of individual rights, and, as a consequence, courts,
passing only on litigated matters of right, and binding them-
selves to resolve every reasonable intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of the acts of a co-ordinate branch govern-
ment-have seldom been under the necessity of exercising the
52 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447.
53 United States v. Butler, 80 L. ed. 287
54 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 587, 589. 79
L. ed. 1593, 1604.
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power of judgment to vindicate reserved rights, and have,
doubtless, hesitated to raise up out of the past and to define
any unenumerated right.
Yet the Ninth Amendment is not meaningless or super-
fluous. Surely it is more than a mere negative on implied
grants of power that might otherwise be asserted because of
the express enumeration of rights in respect of matters where
no power was granted. It must be more than a mere net to
catch fish in supposedly fishless water. It is' certainly more
than a mere emphasis on the doctrine of delegated and enu-
merated powers. It must be a positive declaration of existing,
though unnamed rights, which may be vindicated under the
authority of the Amendment whenever and if ever any gov-
ernmental authority shall aspire to ungranted power in con-
travention of "unenumerated rights."
